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LEGAL THEORY AND LINGUISTIC REALITY:
A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF MODERN LEGAL
SCHOLARSHIP
Marin Roger Scordato*
INTRODUCTION
What is it that we, as students and researchers of the law, expect when
we approach the vast body of academic literature known as "legal scholar-
ship"? What should we expect?
Until quite recently, few legal scholars have attempted to systematically
describe just what legal scholarship is, or what it should attempt to do. I
During a symposium on legal scholarship sponsored by the Yale Law Journal
in the early 1980s, 2 Owen Fiss observed that, "The law ...is lacking a
literature on its own scholarship."' 3 George Fletcher, during the same
symposium, asserted that "we have no jurisprudence of legal scholarship," 4
and Arthur Leff, in trying to describe the nature of legal scholarship, simply
said, "Legal scholarship is what legal scholars do."' 5
Although there may be a relative shortage of scholarly efforts to
systematically analyze legal scholarship as a distinct social and intellectual
activity, there is certainly no lack of criticism aimed at the overall product of
legal scholars. In 1962, Fred Rodell wrote, "There are two things wrong with
almost all legal writing. One is its style. The other is its content. That, I
think, about covers the ground."' 6 Edward Rubin recently wrote:
These are not cheerful times for standard legal scholarship. In fact, the field is
widely perceived as being in a state of disarray. It seems to lack a unified
purpose, a coherent methodology, a sense of forward motion, and a secure link
to its past traditions. It is bedeviled by a gnawing sense that it should adopt the
methods of other disciplines but it is uncertain how the process is to be
accomplished. The field even lacks a conceptual framework within which to
criticize itself.7
These are serious and substantial criticisms. Many have been echoed by
other highly respected legal scholars. 8 They should not, I think, be lightly
dismissed. This essay is my attempt to take up the challenge implicit in these
criticisms; to identify and to clarify both the substantive problems and the
intellectual challenges faced by modern legal scholarship. It represents an
effort to develop an accurate and reasonably functional perspective on legal
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scholarship, and it is my hope that this perspective can serve for some as a
useful framework with which to evaluate the nature and the function of the
large variety of academic work currently produced by legal scholars.
To establish a starting point for the analysis, I begin by identifying and
discussing the possible functions served by scholarship in a legal environ-
ment defined by the classic jurisprudence of natural law. I then consider the
intellectual challenge posed to natural law jurisprudence by the modern
Legal Realist movement and the consequences of that challenge for legal
scholarship in particular. Lastly, I attempt to characterize the mainstream of
current legal scholarship as a series of variations on two very basic intellec-
tual responses to the modern Realist critique of established legal process and
traditional legal scholarship.
NATURAL LAW AND TRADITIONAL LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
Legal scholarship grows out of a specific legal culture, a generally-
accepted jurisprudential view of the way in which legal rules should be
designed and applied to the myriad activities encountered in society. The
concept of "natural law" is one such view. With its roots reaching as far back
as ancient Greek civilization, 9 the concept of natural law begins with the idea
that there exists in the world a universally correct and proper set of legal rules
for the optimal regulation of human behavior, a "natural" and ultimately
preeminent set of basic legal principles. 10
The concept of natural law has been an exceptionally powerful force in
the intellectual history of law and in the actual design of legal systems. 11 Its
embrace of the notion that there exists an ascertainable and normatively
superior moral order in the world is readily compatible with both traditional
religious views of morality (and thus theocratic forms of government) and
with modern science and its search for what are presumed to be the
immutable physical laws of nature.
From a natural law perspective, legal scholarship has at least five
primary functions. The first is to search for the natural law; to determine and
to clearly articulate the normatively "best" set of legal principles upon which
society's legal rules should be based. This is fundamentally a truth-seeking
function and is closely associated in its basic goal and orientation to the work
of natural and social scientists.
The second function of legal scholarship in a natural law world,
following largely from the first, is to design and to develop the full array of
sub-principles, doctrinal rules, and exceptions that logically follow from the
basic principles of natural law. In performing this function, legal scholarship
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is operating much like a form of applied philosophy, in which the mainstream
work of judges and scholars is to rigorously identify and to articulate the
necessary inferences and conclusions that can be logically derived by using
legal reasoning to analyze fundamental legal principles. As Walter Cook,
former Professor of Law at Yale University put it in 1927:
Every judicial act resulting in a judgment consists of a pure deduction. The
figure of its reasoning is the stating of a rule applicable to certain facts, a finding
that the facts of the particular case are those certain facts, and the application of
the rule is a logical necessity .... It must be perfectly apparent to any one who
is willing to admit the rules governing rational mental action that unless the rule
of the major premise exists as antecedent to the ascertainment of the fact or facts
put into the minor premise, there is no judicial act in stating the judgment. 12
A third important function of legal scholarship in a natural law regime is
to describe the current state, and to monitor the future development, of the
law as it actually exists. In performing this function, legal scholars try to
summarize and to systematize the work of a very large number of courts
operating in different jurisdictions at many different appellate levels at
different times, all deciding discrete and individual disputes involving
different parties and different factual elements.
A fourth function of legal scholarship under natural law is the critical
evaluation of existing law. In performing this function, legal scholars, by
closely reading and analyzing appellate court opinions, monitor the actions
of judges and then compare and contrast the results with the ideal set of
principles, doctrines and rules that have been developed by means of a
rigorous logical analysis of natural law principles (the result of the second
function of legal scholarship described above).
The fifth, and for my purposes the final, basic function of legal
scholarship is to serve the more or less bureaucratic needs of the legal
academic profession. It is certainly no surprise to anyone familiar with law
schools and law professors that the production of legal scholarship plays a
critical role in the ordering of formal and informal relationships both
between and within law schools. The status of individual and institutional
careers in legal academia is heavily dependent upon the quantity and
perceived quality of legal scholarship produced.
In quick summary, then, there are at least five basic functions of legal
scholarship in the jurisprudential world of natural law: the identification of
legal first principles (legal truth-seeking); the development of legal doctrine
based on these first principles (conceptual analysis); the depiction of the law
as it actually exists (legal description); the comparison of the existing law to
the natural law ideal (doctrinal analysis); and the creation of incentives and
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the ordering of relationships within legal academia itself (bureaucratic
utility). By separately identifying these five basic functions, I do not mean to
suggest that any given piece of legal scholarship, even under an exhaustively
natural law regime, will fit within only one functional category. On the
contrary, most pieces of legal scholarship seek to simultaneously serve more
than one of these basic functions. However, it is the purpose of this essay to
develop an overall perspective on modern legal scholarship and I believe that
the above taxonomy will prove useful for this purpose.
NATURAL LAW AND THE MODERN REALIST MOVEMENT
Despite the fact that natural law has been facially rejected by our
modern legal culture, it still exerts a powerful influence on much of what
happens in law schools, courts, and law offices. Most of us are told as first-
year law students that legal reasoning involves the rigorous analysis of
general rules of law in order to correctly select and apply the appropriate
legal rules to a particular factual situation. The process as most often
described seems closely akin to a form of applied philosophy, in which "legal
propositions, like so many philosophical propositions, are not statements of
the kind that have empirical truth values." ' 3 In law, much like in philosophy,
these statements serve as seemingly immutable first principles from which
the analysis originates. For example, as George Fletcher has noted:
[I]f the Supreme Court declares the meaning of the Constitution, we might
question the political wisdom of the decision, but one could hardly say that the
Court's statement was true or false. The Court cannot declare what the
Constitution means and at the same time make a mistake about the true meaning
of the Constitution. 14
Perhaps the best and most concise statement of legal scholarship as an
essentially philosophical endeavor belongs to H.L.A. Hart, who has written
that the appropriate scope of general jurisprudence consists, "in the elucida-
tion of fundamental legal notions to be achieved by the analysis of the
distinctive vocabulary of the law and by the classification of its terms in such
a way as to bring out their logical interconnexions [sic]." 15 The vision of a
mature legal system, from this perspective, involves a highly ordered,
carefully structured system of legal rules that have been systematically
derived from fundamental legal principles by means of decades of cumula-
tive logical analysis and reasoned argument in hundreds of appellate cases
and law review articles.
Serious concerns about viewing law as a branch of moral or ethical
philosophy arose within the ranks of legal scholars as early as 1924 when
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John Dewey, himself a philosopher, approvingly quoted Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes when he said:
The actual life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt
necessities of the times, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of
public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share
with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in
determining the rules by which men should be governed. 16
Dewey asserted that "there is a wide gap separating the reasonable
proposition that judicial decisions should possess the maximum possible
regularity in order to enable persons in planning their conduct to foresee the
legal import of their acts, and the absurd because impossible proposition that
every decision should flow with formal logical necessity from antecedently
known premises." 17
The primary focus of this challenge to the traditional philosophical view
of law is the asserted inadequacy of formal logic to the task of satisfactorily
deciding actual legal disputes, and hence, to the task of accurately describing
the actual operation of the law. This critique claims that philosophically
styled legal analysis can only rely upon "objective" legal and philosophical
values that are so abstract that they cannot provide reliable normative
guidance in the resolution of real life legal problems. 18 This critique also
claims that, as a necessary result, philosophically styled legal scholarship
cannot accurately capture the nature and purpose of the law as it actually
operates and exists in the real world.
An important intuition underlying this view of the law and legal
reasoning is that particular deductions may be logically valid but false in fact.
Though concerned primarily with the problems of strictly logical analysis in
another area of academic research, astronomy, Samuel Pierpont Langley has
illustrated the danger of relying on logical induction as the exclusive means
of developing general explanatory laws through the use of an allegory:
We have read somewhere of a race of ephemeral insects who live but an hour. To
those who are born in the early morning the sunrise is the time of youth. They
die of old age while the sun's beams are yet gathering force, and only their
descendants live on to midday; while it is another race which sees the sun's
decline from that which saw it rise. Imagine the sun about to set and the whole
nation of mites gathered under the shadow of some mushroom (to them ancient
as the sun itself) to hear what their wisest philosopher had to say of the gloomy
prospect.
If I remember aright, he first told them that, incredible as it might seem,
there was not once a time in the world's youth when the mushroom itself was
young, but that the sun in those early ages was in the eastern, not in the western
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sky. Since then, he explained, the eyes of the scientific ephemera had followed
it, and established by induction from vast experience the great 'law of nature'
that it moved only westward; and he showed that since it was now nearing the
western horizon, science pointed herself to the conclusion that it was about to
disappear forever, together with the great race of ephemera for whom it was
created. What his hearers thought of this discussion I do not remember, but I
have heard that the sun rose again the next morning. 19
Proponents of traditional doctrinal analysis might respond to the above
critique by agreeing that while there may exist problems in the correct and
proper application of legal doctrine, and while these problems may well be
deserving of attention, the existence of this situation in no way detracts from
the legitimate mandate of legal scholarship to rigorously develop the proper
logical structure of legal doctrine. In fact, these proponents could say, it is
precisely the rigorously logical nature of legal doctrines and doctrinal
systems that distinguishes the necessary and preferred methodology of legal
scholarship from the preferred methodology of scientific research. In addi-
tion to meeting the stated challenge, this response also possesses the
additional advantage of elevating traditional doctrinal analysis to an appro-
priately lofty "academic" plane; one, it suggests, that exists above the
"applied" realm of the actual legal process.
Faced with this response, critics of traditional doctrinal analysis had to
find a way to directly challenge the legitimate authority of strictly logical
legal reasoning as the primary mode of discovering new truth in the field of
the law. Given the number and variety of intellectual bonds that doctrinal
analysis shares with traditional philosophical inquiry, it is somewhat ironic
that it has been the academic discipline of philosophy that has provided
modern legal critics with the conceptual foundation for their most profound
and influential challenge to the legitimacy and efficacy of traditional
doctrinal analysis.
At the core of this challenge is the idea that human language possesses
little, if any, objective meaning. That is to say that the words and syntax that
compose a human language have very little meaning independent of the
customs, usages, and values that are in effect in the society in which the
language functions. When the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein, 20 writes
that, " .. .to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life," 21 he is
highlighting the fact that language is the major tool by which a human
society conceptually categorizes and systematizes the otherwise uselessly
random and dissonant mass of sensory stimuli that can be perceived by
human senses. From this perspective, human language contains within it a
full ontology; a categorized and systematized version of the world.
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Once seen as an integral and inseparable element of the human society
in which it exists, language quickly loses the status of a value-neutral
medium which is used to objectively refer to extra-linguistic objects out in
the world. Instead, language is seen as a symbolic medium which derives its
meaning from the changing human values and linguistic conventions that
exist in a given linguistic community at any given time. One way to
appreciate this insight is to reflect upon the difficulty of defining, or
translating, idiomatic words and phrases outside the particular contexts in
which they thrive. For example, the phrase "grade point average" could
hardly be adequately explained to a naive listener without describing the
dynamics and the structure of the academic world in which the phrase exists
and has meaning. Similarly, many words in our language possess a large
number of possible formal meanings. The word "court" for example carries
fifteen separate definitions. 22 As a result, the selection of the correct
meaning to ascribe to a particular use of the word "court" depends almost
entirely on the social context in which the word is used.
Given this view of language, statements of logical classification are not
seen as descriptions of objectively valid and final truths about the world, but
are instead seen as working hypotheses and mental devices to which we
resort in order to deal more effectively with our experiences, and which are
subject to change and revision in the light of further experience.
Legal scholars soon recognized the potential power that these new ideas
regarding language could have when transferred to the field of law and, most
vigorously in the 1920s and 1930s, 23 they applied these new insights to the
traditional structure of legal scholarship. What resulted, for the most part,
was a powerful critique of both the efficacy and the legitimacy of under-
standing the law by means of logical doctrinal analysis. This new perspective
was adopted and espoused by some of the most respected and influential
members of the Bar: "The whole outline of the law is the resultant of a
conflict at every point between logic and good sense-the one striving to
work fiction out to consistent results, the other restraining and at last
overcoming that effort when the results become too manifestly unjust." 24
For the purposes of this essay, I will group the sometimes varied proponents
of this line of criticism under the label "Legal Realists" (or "Realists"), with
the explicit recognition that not all the scholars cited would necessarily
classify themselves as such, and that criticism of traditional legal scholarship
does not by any means exhaust the range of ideas embraced by the Legal
Realists.
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Perhaps the most straight-forward description of the application of
these new philosophical ideas on language to the field of law has been made
by Mark Tushnet:
The problem of language is that when lawyers look at a complex system of rules,
they find that the rules, and the standard rhetorical devices for manipulating
them, can justify any result at all-or, put differently, justify no results. Since
controversies are in fact resolved, the problem of language means that the
outcomes rest on choices external to the system of rules. 25
Realists assert that legal rules cannot guide courts to definite results in
particular cases because of the logical indeterminacy of the language which
constitutes the legal rules. Because of this indeterminacy, a single legal
doctrine can often be interpreted in various ways to support very different
legal conclusions. This assertion is supported by the Realists' factual
observation that the actual legal precedents in most areas of substantive law
are extremely varied, and the more conceptual observation that "the accept-
able techniques of legal reasoning, such as distinguishing on the basis of the
facts or analogizing to other areas of law where cognate problems arise, are
so flexible that they allow us to assemble diverse precedents as we wish." 26
As a result, " . . . there is no compelling reason of pure logic which forces
the judge to apply any one of the competing rules urged on him by opposing
counsel. His task is not to find the preexisting but previously hidden meaning
of the terms in these rules; it is to give them a meaning." 27
LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP AND THE MODERN REALIST
MOVEMENT
While it is clear that the Realist critique of the traditional conception of
the legal process has had a profound impact on the way in which most of us,
and legal scholars particularly, think about law and the operation of the legal
system, it is far less clear just what impact the Realist analysis has had on the
activity of legal scholars and the product of legal scholarship. As a means of
approaching this issue, I would like to utilize the five traditional purposes of
legal scholarship that I identified as existing in a natural law environment: the
identification of legal first principles (legal truth-seeking); the development
of legal doctrine based on these first principles (conceptual analysis); the
depiction of the law as it actually exists (legal description); the comparison of
the existing law to the natural law ideal (doctrinal analysis); and the creation
of incentives and the ordering of relationships within legal academia itself
(bureaucratic utility).
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In a natural law environment, these five separate functions of legal
scholarship operate in close harmony. Legal scholars engaged in the regular
teaching of law students and possessed of a desire to improve the legal
system and to aid the bench and the practicing bar can rather easily further
each of these goals and activities by engaging in traditional legal scholarship.
At bottom, a more or less unified set of intellectual talents and conceptual
tools are called upon in legal truth-seeking, conceptual analysis, legal
description and doctrinal analysis under a natural law approach. In addition,
and quite importantly, it is this same set of intellectual talents that law
professors are presumed to be imparting to law students through their
instruction-the oft-cited ability to "think like a lawyer."
In a post-Realist environment, however, the proper goals and purposes
of legal scholarship become much murkier and much more difficult to
discern. In fact, the Realist-based critique of legal scholarship has itself
seemed to evolve in at least two increasingly separate directions. On the one
hand, some Realists have linked their criticism of traditional legal scholar-
ship to an explicit political agenda. 28 These critics have employed the notion
of a value-laden language to challenge the traditional liberal political ideal of
objective law as the guardian and guarantee of individual freedoms against
the illegitimate intrusion of governmental power, and to characterize tradi-
tional legal scholarship as an essentially rationalizing and legitimizing
enterprise. 29 Alan Freeman, for example, writes:
I would suggest . . . that the production of liberal scholarship is really part of
the process of fashioning a legitimating ideology that makes the world appear as
if it were not the one we live in, that makes it seem legitimate, that holds out
utopian promises while ensuring their nonattainment, that cuts off access to
genuine possibilities of transformation . . . . The process of delegitimating
scholarship eventually reveals a world that is characterized more by conflict than
by harmony, and by patterns of illegitimate hierarchy. 30
The second aspect of the Realist critique, while not as explicitly
political in nature, also strongly challenges the status of traditional legal
scholarship as a genuine truth-seeking activity. In other words, the Realists
claim that while doctrinal analysis may attempt to work out the proper logical
relations between legal doctrines when different values and conventions are
plugged into the basic premises, it will never really discover new truth about
the law itself or about the legal process as it actually exists; and in this sense
doctrinal analysis does not pursue the same ends and goals as does
scholarship in the social or natural sciences.
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Instead of searching for as yet unknown empirical facts, traditional legal
scholarship "is exhausted by the description of patterns in authoritative
myth, without systematic investigation of the degree to which they are in fact
controlling." 31 Consequently, " [wihen inquiry is focused only upon rules of
law- perspectives-to the exclusion of actual choices or practices-opera-
tions-there can be no assurance that it will have any relevance to what is
actually happening in a community." 32 This has led at least one scholar to
conclude that "the obvious partisanship of the professional [academic]
enterprise, and the realist perception that prescriptions will be adopted or not
for reasons independent of their rational force, deprive . . . [the vast major-
ity of law review] articles of intellectual interest." 33
POST-REALIST LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
It is my belief that current legal scholarship can most productively be
viewed as an amalgamation of varied scholarly responses to the legal realist
critique of traditional doctrinal analysis. What follows is a brief description
of what I perceive to be the two major reactions to the Realist critique
currently present in modern legal scholarship: teleological analysis and
denial.
THE TELEOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF LAW
Legal scholarship that I believe falls within the category of "Teleologi-
cal Analysis" appears, at least on one level, to have solved the conceptual
dilemma posed by Wittgenstein and the Realists. It does this chiefly by
making explicit the social policy choices that are used to interpret and
analyze both general principles and specific legal doctrine. Once the
interpretive value choices have been made explicit, legal scholars can
productively assert and refute whether one or another doctrinal system best
achieves the desired result without the problem of disguised subjectivity
encountered by more traditional doctrinal analysis. Some scholars have
described this style of scholarship as "legal engineering." 34 The conceptual
foundation for this methodological approach in the field of law was clearly
articulated as early as 1927:
Underlying any scientific study of law, it is submitted, will lie one fundamental
postulate, viz., that human laws are devices, tools which society uses as one of
its methods to regulate human conduct and to promote those types of it which
are regarded as desirable. If so, it follows that the worth or value of a given rule
of law can be determined only by finding out how it works, that is, by
ascertaining, so far as that can be done, whether it promotes or retards the
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attainment of desired ends. If this is to be done, quite clearly we must know what
at any given period these ends are and also whether the means selected, the
given rules of law, are indeed adapted to securing them. 35
There are at least three other significant differences between teleologi-
cal legal analysis and traditional doctrinal analysis. The first of these
differences is the greater degree to which teleological analysis, as compared
with doctrinal analysis, does not smoothly mesh with the routine legal
analysis that takes place in actual adjudicative practice. So long as it is still
the case that the great majority of legal disputes are decided by courts on the
outward basis of a standard analysis of the facts and the applicable legal
precedent, then teleological analysis will be removed enough from direct use
by practitioners and judges to acquire a certain "scholarly" quality not
always enjoyed by traditional doctrinal analysis. In cruder terms, one can
almost think of legal scholars operating in this mode as having shifted from
viewing the law from the implementation-oriented perspective of a judge or
an advocate, as is done in large part in traditional doctrinal analysis, to
viewing the law from a larger legislative perspective; one that is primarily
concerned with identifying and evaluating the various factors that should be
considered and analyzed in the process of developing the law itself.
This first difference between teleological and doctrinal analysis gives
rise to the second. Because teleological analysis, by its very nature, focuses
on the degree to which different doctrinal systems succeed in achieving the
policy choices, or social values, for which they were designed, it must itself
refer to a social reality that is external to the law and the legal system. Unlike
traditional doctrinal analysis, which by its own notion of the rigorously
logical and stolidly objective nature of law can comfortably confine the scope
of its inquiry to the contents of a legal library, teleological analysis is
necessarily committed to an examination of the nature of the interaction
between the substance of the law and the procedures of the legal system on
the one hand, and the actual behavior of those actors and systems of actors
that are meant to be influenced and regulated by the law on the other hand.
Without such an examination, teleological analysis would possess no princi-
pled way of describing or predicting the degree to which even the simplest
doctrinal system would actually achieve its stated purpose.
It is in this necessary commitment to an examination of extra-legal
reality, however, that teleological analysis begins to encounter its most
serious methodological problems. Perhaps it is the powerful and continuing
legacy of traditional doctrinal analysis at work, but it appears as if the great
majority of teleological legal analysis currently produced continues to
267
J. Contemp. Legal Issues Modern Legal Scholarship
[2: 257, 1989]
confine the scope of its research to the four corners of the law library. 36
Because of this practice, the raw data of most teleological analysis is the
written and reported appellate case decision.
Since reported appellate cases (hereinafter "cases") constitute the basic
facts in the legal scholar's epistemology, there must also exist a basic, though
often unstated, assumption that the available facts in the cases correspond in
a reasonably satisfactory manner to the actual state of affairs in the relevant
world at large. Without such an assumption, any scholarly claim with respect
to the relative efficacy of different doctrinal schemes is, at best, problematic.
Nonetheless, there exist a large number of reasons to believe that the above
assumption is, in fact, without sufficient factual foundation to support the
basic intellectual ambitions of teleological analysis. 37
The most serious problems involved in assuming that reported appellate
cases accurately correspond to the societal behavior of relevant parties
outside of the legal system can be divided into two basic categories: (1) those
that demonstrate that the civil or criminal trial is a very inaccurate process
for systematically gathering all of the facts that are relevant to the considera-
tion of a legal doctrine; (2) and those that demonstrate that reported appellate
opinions cannot be relied upon to be representative of the actual operation of
the law in society or the frequency of types of lawsuits that are dealt with by
the legal system as a whole.
Taking the former category first, the following passage illustrates the
basic thrust of the argument:
[The Federal Rules of Evidence] recognize that there are other policies served
by rules of evidence aside from reaching accurate decisions as to what happened
in a particular case. In dealing with offers to compromise evidence of insurance,
subsequent remedial measures, and privileges, for example, the Trial Judge
must consider factors other than accurate reconstruction of historical
facts .... In short, there are other factors to be weighed against the probative
value of evidence. 38
The Federal Rules of Evidence, however, are not the exclusive source of
impediments to the trial being a vehicle for accurate investigation of
historical facts. Another very significant impediment is the impact and
operation of the exclusionary rule in criminal cases. 39
In addition to impediments in the form of evidentiary and procedural
rules, there exists a rather substantial risk of historical inaccuracy when an
appellate court is faced with the task of reconstructing the relevant facts for
its written opinion after a general verdict from the trier of fact at the trial level
has left the relevant facts unidentified or undecided. In such cases, the
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appellate court has little choice but to create a new history of the case from
the briefs and the arguments of the advocates, and the cold written record of
the trial proceedings.
It should be noted here that few, if any, legal scholars have seriously
suggested that adjudicative procedures be redesigned in such a way as to
increase the purely investigatory capabilities of the civil or criminal trial.
Indeed, trials are generally recognized to be forums that seek to provide the
fairest possible resolution of legal disputes, engaging in historical fact-
finding only in those ways, and only to the extent, necessary to satisfy that
most basic function. The problem, for the purposes of this essay, arises when
legal scholars substitute the very limited and specialized fact-finding efforts
of the courts for more thorough and accurate empirical research into the
various ways in which significant actors respond to a given system, or a
particular modification in a given system, of legal rules.
Turning now to the second category of problems, those that tend to
demonstrate that reported appellate opinions cannot be relied upon to be
representative of the actual operation of the law in society or the frequency of
types of lawsuits that are dealt with by the legal system as a whole, the latter
half of the above disjunction can be rather easily demonstrated by noting: (1)
that something less than five percent of all civil cases are litigated through
trial to verdict; 40 (2) that of those civil cases that are fully tried, less than one
percent are appealed; 4' and (3) that factors completely extrinsic to the
representativeness or importance of the legal issues involved, usually the
anticipated expense of the appeals process and the amount in controversy,
play an enormous role in determining what questions and issues will be
considered by the appellate court. 42
Regarding the legal reasoning set forth in most written appellate
opinions, John Dewey had this to say almost sixty years ago:
It is at this point that the chief stimulus and temptation to mechanical logic and
abstract use of formal concepts come in. Just because the personal element
cannot be wholly excluded, while at the same time the decision must assume as
nearly as possible an impersonal, objective, rational form, the temptation is to
surrender the vital logic which has actually yielded the conclusion and to
substitute for it forms of speech which are rigorous in appearance and which
give an illusion of certitude. 43
At a minimum, it seems safe to say that the explications of legal
reasoning set forth in written appellate opinions are, by their very nature,
exercises in rationalization that should rarely, if ever, be accepted at face
value by a responsible legal scholar.
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The above two broad categories of epistemological problems encoun-
tered by teleological analysis, when taken together, present a formidable
challenge to the efficacy and accuracy of this type of scholarship. In its
strongest form, this challenge asserts that:
The effects of laws and legal institutions on society can be neither deduced nor
induced from an analysis based exclusively on the statements of the legal
system's operatives; in other words, legal scholars who devote their attentions
solely to case opinions, statutes, and administrative rules cannot reliably know
the underlying facts and circumstances that the cases, statutes, and rules purport
to reflect. 44
It should be recognized here that there is at least one sub-category of
teleological analysis which has, in my opinion, managed to escape both the
normative/objective problems posed by Wittgenstein and the Realists as well
as the epistemological problems outlined above, and this is the now fairly
well established field of Law and Economics. In general, scholarship that is
thought to fall under the Law and Economics rubric borrows both social
value choices and behavioral assumptions from the long established aca-
demic field of economics. 45 The general intellectual strategy being employed
is the adoption of highly simplified models of social reality for use in legal
analysis, with the hope of achieving both greater analytic rigor and increased
elegance in the resulting product. 46
The relevant question in evaluating scholarship of this type becomes
whether anything significant is lost when we accept the tightly structured
models of human behavior offered by these scholars. At least one commenta-
tor has answered this question by asserting that:
[tihe simplifying approach in law and microeconomic analysis achieves ele-
gance at the cost of accuracy. If the complexity of the real world is taken into
account, the analysis provides neither a full positive description of nor an
accurate prescriptive guide to the development of legal rules in all their
variety. 47
Perhaps it is, in the final analysis, most productive to view and evaluate
the Law and Economics material in much the same way as one would
evaluate any other highly formalized system of thought (like Euclidian
geometry); which means not asking to what degree it possesses explanatory
power, or how empirically accurate it is, but to instead say that so long as the
theory under examination contains within itself no inconsistencies or absur-
dities, then it should be regarded as true in so far as it is interesting or useful.
One conclusion that could be drawn from the foregoing analysis is that
in order for legal scholarship in the form of teleological legal analysis to
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achieve its fullest academic ambitions, it must become very seriously
involved in empirical social research. After all, it is only through rigorous
empirical research that legal scholars can confidently identify and discuss the
likely societal effects of possible variations in legal rules. A fundamentally
instrumentalist approach to law is a necessary part of teleological legal
analysis and such an approach, if bereft of supporting empirical research, is
fueled only by seat-of-the-pants hunches and the social intuitions of the
author of the work. This basis for instrumentalist legal analysis is partic-
ularly suspect when one considers the fact that the overwhelming number of
likely authors of such pieces-professors of law-were born into similar
circumstances, educated in much the same way, and reside, on the whole, in
roughly the same socio-economic class.
This clear need for teleological legal analysis to engage in empirical
research gives rise to the third important difference between teleological
legal analysis and traditional doctrinal analysis, and that is the very signifi-
cant difference in their relative bureaucratic utility. As I have noted earlier, a
law professor engaging in traditional legal analysis, which Richard Posner
describes as, " . . . the careful reading and comparison of appellate opin-
ions with a view to identifying ambiguities, exposing inconsistencies among
cases and lines of cases, developing distinctions, reconciling holdings, and
otherwise exercising the characteristic skills of legal analysis,"' 48 is operat-
ing in almost complete harmony with his or her other institutional respon-
sibilities, most notably the responsibility to teach law students. A law
professor engaged in the empirical research necessary to support teleological
legal analysis however:
(1) is occupied by an activity which has little relevance to, and will
undoubtedly draw personal resources away from, the teaching of law
students. Even now, there have been questions raised about the degree to
which law faculties effectively train students to practice law in the world
outside of the appellate judge's chamber and the calls for a greater presence in
the curriculum of clinical courses has been answered by utilitarian argu-
ments in favor of predominately theoretical and policy-based approaches to
learning the law. One can only imagine the furor that would be created by
significant numbers of law faculty taking up the challenge of empirical social
research and thus further distancing themselves, at least intellectually, from
the professional aspirations of their students.
(2) is engaged in an activity which will require enormous resources to
complete effectively. Sophisticated empirical research of any sort, and large-
scale empirical social research in particular, is notoriously expensive. It
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seems unlikely that any law school, save for those associated with large
research universities, could possibly afford it. Even those law schools that
are associated with large research universities are most likely to require legal
research to be funded in the way that most research in the university is funded
-through the acquisition by individual faculty members of research grants,
either from the federal government or from private foundations, corpora-
tions, and individuals. The most salient problem associated with such
financing for legal research, apart from the fact that there has been no history
of such funding and there simply may not exist a significant pool of interested
patrons, is the perception of political or ideological bias that will inevitably
accompany it.
(3) is involved in an activity for which the law professor is very likely
not sufficiently trained. On the whole, law faculty are recruited by law
schools after having completed an undergraduate degree, a professional
degree program in law, and then either a judicial clerkship (or a series of
clerkships) and/or experience for a few years in private law practice. 49 None
of these experiences, even when taken together, constitute sufficient training
in the kind of sophisticated empirical research necessary to support serious
teleological analysis.
Perhaps because of these problems, and the resulting incompatibility
between teleological legal analysis and the bureaucratic needs of law schools,
a second major reaction to the Realist critique of traditional legal scholarship
has emerged.
DENIAL
Simply put, denial describes post-Realist legal scholarship that pro-
ceeds more or less as if the Realist critique of traditional legal scholarship did
not exist. According to Robert Gordon, "The purest form of denial is [for
current legal scholars] to assert that legal reasoning's exclusive concern
should be to work out the relationship of legal texts to a system of
suprahistorical norms transcending time and space."' 50 Far from being a
small, isolated, hold-out realm of traditional legal scholarship in the post-
Realist academic world, classical doctrinal analysis, seemingly unaffected
by the intellectual challenge of the Realist critique, apparently continues to
occupy the very mainstream of current legal scholarship. 51 It is not at all hard
to find modern legal scholars saying openly that current" . . . legal scholars
have ignored or rejected without serious analysis the disturbing implications
of the Realist challenge to the objectivity of the rule of law.", 52 and that,
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consequently, "[l]egal scholarship proceeds as if the Realist critique had
never been made." 53
How should one approach this type of legal scholarship in light of the
insights provided by Wittgenstein and the Realists? As an initial matter, I
think that the Realist critique has rather persuasively demonstrated that
classical legal doctrinal analysis can no longer be viewed and evaluated in the
same manner as traditional truth-seeking scholarship in the social and
natural sciences. It does not seem to be a useful or productive endeavor to
question the empirical truth of the products of doctrinal analysis, nor to
expect one piece of scholarship in this vein to definitively disprove or to
supersede another. Does this mean that the product taken as a whole is
useless? I do not think so.
I believe that a better perspective on traditional doctrinal analysis is one
that views it within the larger context of the legal profession. Certainly,
practicing lawyers and judges have little choice but to engage in creative and
sophisticated doctrinal analysis in the pursuit of their professional practice;
and legal scholars, much like scholars in those other area of academia that
border and support professional practice (e.g. medicine, engineering, archi-
tecture, and psychology), can be thought of as pursuing and expanding the
basic intellectual activity (in this case, legal reasoning) that provides the
conceptual foundation for the practical professional activity. From the
perspective of the practicing Bar, therefore, legal scholarship of this sort is a
research tool which can often provide very efficient access to the most
respected and relevant cases in an area and can occasionally serve as a source
of sophisticated legal arguments on either side of a particular doctrinal issue.
From the perspective of law students, legal scholarship of this sort serves an
important pedagogical purpose as an example of the best and the brightest
application of legal reasoning available. From the larger perspective of the
legal system, this type of scholarship, by providing to judges and practicing
lawyers a very high-level analysis of both general legal doctrine and specific
legal rules, certainly serves to elevate the quality of both advocacy and
adjudication in the legal system.
Given the obvious utility of traditional doctrinal analysis for the
interests represented by the perspectives discussed above, and its problem-
atic status as a truth-seeking endeavor, it becomes especially important to
highlight the political nature of this type of scholarship. Political, not in the
Realists' sense of legitimating a given social order, but because the very
nature of interpreting inherently ambiguous linguistic statements (rules of
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law) requires a commitment to some relatively stable set of social values and
choices. Even the classic treatises of the common law have been recognized
to possess a significant political component: "In an era when the courts were
guarded about their capacity to 'make law,' the treatise was a vehicle for
subtle and diplomatic advocacy, often under the guise of saying what the law
was." 
54
This insight can potentially provide readers with an evaluative perspec-
tive by which to evaluate, at least as a preliminary matter, the relative merit of
any given product of traditional doctrinal analysis. Assuming that the theory
advanced is not plagued by internal inconsistencies or patent absurdities
(these being first-order evaluative criteria for any piece of scholarship), then
the value of this sort of theory is measured by the degree that it is regarded as
conceptually interesting or heuristically useful; but not to the extent that it is
considered to be "true" in any traditionally empirical sense. From this
perspective, the outwardly objective posture of most traditional doctrinal
analysis can be seen as an essentially strategic technique for enhancing both
the persuasive power of the particular position set forth in the piece, as well
as the general persuasive potency of this genre of scholarship as a whole; and
while this veneer of objectivity is important in order to attain maximum
influence for a given piece, it is perhaps more important that sophisticated
users of this type of scholarship not be drawn into investing valuable
intellectual time and effort into attempts to definitively prove or disprove
such theories.
There are at least two additional aspects of this analysis worth noting.
The first involves the choice of an appropriate academic analogy. While the
objective posture of most doctrinal analysis might lead one to look toward
the social and natural sciences for an appropriate evaluative framework with
which to assess the relative merit of a given piece of scholarship, the above
analysis points instead toward philosophy and the humanities as the proper
sphere from which to borrow an evaluative scheme. As Richard Posner has
noted:
[dioctrinal analysis today is a humane rather than scientific discipline. As in the
other humanities, great emphasis is placed on writing well (sometimes on
writing impressively-which is not the same thing), footnoting copiously,
treating every topic exhaustively, and staying within the linguistic and concep-
tual parameters of the doctrines being analyzed. Soundness is valued above
originality, thoroughness above brevity; originality, where it is present, tends,
indeed, to be concealed. 55
The second aspect of the above analysis that I believe worthy of note is
the light that it sheds on what some observers believe to be the declining
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status of traditional doctrinal analysis as a powerful influencing factor in the
adjudicative process. Richard Posner has stated that "doctrinal analy-
sis . . . is currently endangered at leading law schools" 56 and Christopher
Stone suggests that "[t]he aspiration that drove the traditional treatise-to
locate the quintessential legal rules and principles-was at the least, deflated
by the realist attack."' 57
The account of traditional doctrinal analysis detailed in this essay
explains, to some extent, this apparent decline by pointing out that the
persuasive power of traditional legal scholarship would naturally decrease as
those who are generally persuaded by it become increasingly aware of the
necessarily non-technical value choices that underlie the work. In fact, some
commentators sincerely believe that as the insights provided by Wittgenstein
and the Realists become more generally understood, the traditional persua-
sive power of legal scholarship that is based on purely doctrinal analysis may
fade significantly. 58
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